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President Barack Obama has outlined a course toward lower numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons. Much 
attention has been paid to the U.S.-Russian context, where deterrence is believed to be basically stable 
and conditions ripe for gradually reducing arsenals on both sides.  But considerably less attention has 
been paid to the possible implications of lower nuclear numbers on other regions of the world and the 
reactions of both adversaries and U.S. allies.  If nuclear reductions are to be stabilizing and beneficial 
to security, reassurance and strengthened nonproliferation efforts in various regions need to 
accompany nuclear cuts.  But the specific problems and remedies across regions vary.  This report 
summarizes the results of a multi-author study conducted with support from the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency.1  It concludes that regions with U.S. allies and formal extended deterrence pledges 
may pose more vexing problems than those areas of the world without such close allies or 
commitments.  It suggests that specific efforts to engage these allies, particularly in terms of planning 




In 2009, President Barack Obama gave a speech in Prague in which he outlined a course toward 
achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, consistent with U.S. commitments under Article VI of the 
                                                
1 The principal investigator thanks the following individuals for their contributions to this project: Wade Huntley, Paul 
Kapur, James Russell, Nikolai Sokov, Chris Twomey, and David Yost.  Jon Wolfsthal and Fred Wehling also 
provided valuable comments on the papers during a workshop held at the Naval Postgraduate School on December 
18, 2012. 
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Non-Proliferation Treaty.  The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reiterated this commitment but 
emphasized the “very demanding” conditions for getting to zero.”2  The NPR noted that a significant 
portion of the problem stems from existing regional conflicts.  Recognizing these current conditions, 
the NPR stated that the United States has to focus on “maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and 
reinforcing regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military 
capabilities.”3  Notably, recent nuclear developments by North Korea have resulted in requests by 
South Korea and Japan for consultations with Washington about extended deterrence, seeking a 
confirmation of U.S. nuclear commitments.  Similarly, many NATO countries remain uncomfortable 
with the notion of removing existing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from European soil.  Thus, while 
the rhetoric of “zero nuclear weapons” is appealing at a global level, considerably more work needs to 
be done at the regional level to build the groundwork for such conditions.  The NPR stated in regard 
to this challenge: “But we can—and must—work actively to create those conditions.”4   
 
With this directive in mind, an important requirement is learning more about regional nuclear 
dynamics and developing strategies to deal with them.  Unfortunately, in the current literature, there is 
a troubling gap in regard to the regional implications of moving to low nuclear numbers.  Only a few 
recent studies discuss the problem and none get deeply into original source materials or interviews 
with experts and officials in regions of concern.  One useful scoping study by David J. Trachtenberg, 
however, lays out some of the key issues, noting: “Strategic force reductions pursued, for example, as 
part of a bilateral U.S.-Russia effort to diminish reliance on nuclear weapons may have unintended 
consequences for assurance and extended deterrence.”5     
 
Since the end of the Cold War, there have been a number of efforts to revive consideration of 
minimum deterrence postures and, eventually, move toward the complete elimination of nuclear 
weapons.  These efforts have been joined by some significant figures from the Cold War U.S. nuclear 
establishment, including Henry Kissinger, William Perry, George Schultz, Fred Ikle, and others.  But 
                                                
2 U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Article,” April 2010, p. xv. 
3 Ibid., p. 7. 
4 Ibid., p. xv. 
5 David J. Trachtenberg, “US Extended Deterrence: How Much Strategic Force Is Too Little?” Strategic Studies 
Quarterly 6 (Summer 2012),  p. 73. 
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recent arguments have tended to focus on relatively simplistic lessons about deterrence drawn from 
the early days of nuclear weapons.  Existing studies of the question of low numbers have similarly 
tended to focus on strategic relations between the United States and Russia only, to the neglect of 
other nuclear states.  A number of experts have asserted, largely using a deductive approach, that lower 
numbers—even as low as 311 deployed U.S. nuclear weapons6—can be achieved relatively painlessly 
and with few effects on deterrence or strategic stability.  As Forsyth, Saltzman, and Schaub argue 
about the thousands of nuclear weapons deployed during the Cold War: “the actual marginal utility of 
additional forces was quite small.”7 In support of their arguments, these and other advocates of lower 
numbers point to the work of such early theorists as Bernard Brodie and Arnold Wolfers in the 1940s, 
who believed nuclear security could be accomplished with very small arsenals because of the 
tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons.8  However, these older studies were written under 
the expectation of conditions of nuclear bipolarity and came well before the level of even 1,000 
nuclear weapons had been reached.   
 
Later Cold War beliefs on nuclear stability raised doubts about the desirability of moving to low 
numbers of nuclear weapons. As Lawrence Freedman explains: “The concept of mutual assured 
destruction did not indicate any value in reductions of offensive weapons.  If anything, excessive 
reductions could be destabilizing if they went past the point where destruction could no longer be 
assured.”9  Today, while U.S.-Russian tensions have decreased dramatically, gradual proliferation has 
increased the number of nuclear states and the world political structure is characterized by more 
complex multipolar dynamics.   
 
Given the passage of time, many U.S. allies have become accustomed to extended deterrence at high 
levels of nuclear armaments, meaning that trade-offs in allotting weapons to the allied mission hardly 
existed in the past and counterforce scenarios seemed highly credible.  Despite this context, the recent 
literature on low numbers has failed almost entirely to address security perceptions among U.S. allies 
                                                
6 James Wood Forsyth, Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub, Jr., “Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring 
Value of Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 4 (Spring 2010). 
7 Ibid., p. 82. 
8 See, for example, Brodie’s and Wolfers’s contributions in Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Order 
and World Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1946). 
9 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2003), p. 339.   
 6 
or views of nuclear weapons in regions that are rife with tensions, where nuclear weapons are seen as 
beneficial to security and even stability.  One recent and much-publicized study by the Carnegie 
Endowment’s James Acton, for example, makes the case that prospects for deterrence at low numbers 
(which he defines as 500 nuclear weapons) are “generally good.”10  But Acton’s focus is technical and 
his logic is largely deductive.  Thus, while he might be right about the narrow U.S.-Russian context, his 
study is of limited value in considering the rest of the world.  As for the regional context, Acton 
assumes that China, India, Pakistan, India, the United Kingdom, France, and North Korea need not to 
be considered since their arsenals are still well below his 500 limit.  He also chooses to make “black 
box” assumptions about politics in key allied countries. This leads him to predict their automatic 
acceptance of U.S. extended deterrence pledges at lower levels of weapons and conditions of 
continued regional stability.  
 
Unfortunately, even with the United States moving to New START numbers of 1,550 deployed 
weapons, regional allies have already voiced their concerns.  As a study led by Bruce Blair in support of 
lower U.S-Russian numbers and on the value of de-alerting admits: “The bi-polar nuclear balance 
analyzed in this study will have to be broadened into a multi-polar balance, the stability of which at 
very low numbers remains an open question.”11  Indeed, another study by the Royal United Services 
Institute in England makes the case that despite past restraint in nuclear numbers by smaller nuclear 
states, continued moves downward in the context of deeper reductions by the United States and 
Russia “cannot be taken for granted.”12 
 
The issue of how countries allied with the United States might react politically or militarily to U.S. 
nuclear reductions has not been adequately considered.  For this reason, we must view such deductive 
studies as “best-case” scenarios.  Other recent articles have made deductive arguments in the worst-
case direction.  Wall Street Journal columnist Bret Stephens argues that the real choice facing the Unites 
                                                
10 James Acton, Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security (Adelphi 
Series 50, No. 417, March 2011), p. 94. 
11 Bruce Blair, Victor Esin, Matthew MacKinzie, Valery Yarynich, and Pavel Zolotarev, “One Hundred Nuclear Wars: 
Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence 
of Limited Missile Defenses,” Science and Global Security 19 (October 2011), p. 186. 
12 Malcolm Chalmers, Andrew Sommerville, and Andrea Berger, eds., “Small Nuclear Forces: Five Perspectives,” 
Whitehall Reports, No. 3-11, December 2011,  Royal United Services Institute, London, United Kingdom, p. 9. 
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States is “between a world of fewer U.S. nuclear weapons and more nuclear states, or the opposite.”13  
He concludes: “In his idealism, the president is setting the stage for a more nuclearized world.”14   But 
this may not be true either.  Instead, we need to deal with actual conditions in various regions and the 
specific national perspectives that will affect the speed and success of U.S. and other countries’ nuclear 
reductions as well as regional proliferation tendencies.   
 
Drawing on a team of senior experts on regional nuclear affairs, this project—supported by funding 
from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency—sought to dig much deeper into the potential problems 
of low nuclear numbers region-by-region and to develop possible solutions.  It did so not only by 
focusing on regional politics, alliance stability, and regional security writ large, but also by considering 
the impact of larger planned reductions than New START levels of 1,550.  Clearly, if the United States 
is considering moving to zero, it is necessary to understand the possible implications of getting to 
1,000 weapons and lower. 
 
This project sought to outline possible problems down the road in various regions and possible means 
of addressing them before they become unsolvable obstacles that could lead to future nuclear 
proliferation, strategic instability, or even conflict.  Some of the findings of the project include the 
following general points: 
• Beliefs about nuclear weapons in various countries and within various regions matter.  
• Perceptions about the U.S. commitment to provide security to allies and the 
continuity and credibility of these pledges may matter more than the specific number 
of nuclear weapons.  
• The process of nuclear reductions will matter in how successful or unsuccessful it is, 
requiring advance notice and close consultations with both allies and adversaries. 
• Reassurance may be a more important driver of nuclear requirements than 
deterrence, because it is easier to convince an adversary that you will fire back if 
attacked than it is to convince an ally that you will come to his defense in a situation 
where you have not been attacked. 
                                                




Despite these general observations, the most notable finding of this research is that the implications of 
U.S. reductions in nuclear numbers are not uniform across regions.  Instead, due to differences in 
history, the structure of alliances, the nature of security assurances, and assumptions about nuclear 
weapons themselves, the problems that might be created are likely to be unique to each part of the 
world and the possible responses to them will also need to be tailored to the specific characteristics 
and requirements of each region. This point highlights the importance of what we might call 
“differentiated” nuclear reassurance and deterrence, where strategies may need to vary across regions 
and indeed be tailored to individual countries, whether adversary or ally. 
 
This paper provides a summary of some of the main findings from the four regions studied: Europe, 
the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia.15  It shows how some of the most sensitive details of U.S. 
nuclear reductions may involve allies, not adversaries.  It also argues that new mechanisms may need 
to be put into place to provide non-nuclear forms of reassurance prior to moving forward with further 
cuts.  At the same time, it argues that signaling to potential adversaries and to prospective partners in 
moving to very low numbers will be critical if such efforts are to be possible.  Underlying this research 
is the premise that nuclear reductions are indeed about improving security, not lower numbers for 
their own sake.  Absent new mechanisms for overcoming problems and for providing that security, 
countries are surely not going to be willing to reduce or eliminate their arsenals, regardless of what the 
United States does.  The paper concludes with a set of policy recommendations, as well as thoughts on 
some possible directions for further research. 
EUROPE 
Europe is often considered to be the most stable region in the world from a nuclear weapons 
perspective.  The legacy of apparently successful Cold War nuclear deterrence, the post-Cold War 
U.S.-Soviet political rapprochement, the vast drawdown in the U.S. and Russian arsenals, the removal 
of intermediate-range nuclear forces, and cuts in both British and French nuclear forces all seem to 
predict relative ease in moving to lower numbers.  But certain factors in NATO Europe and in Russia 
pose possible problems for stability at lower numbers. 
 
                                                
15 As of this writing, the individual studies are under review for publication in an academic journal.  
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David Yost points out that European countries are used to the protection provided by the U.S. nuclear 
guarantee.16  While some countries in Europe no longer advocate maintaining nuclear weapons on the 
European continent, he says that most countries would be uncomfortable if this nuclear guarantee 
were withdrawn altogether, or, in some cases, even challenged at all through reductions.17  This is 
especially true in new NATO states adjacent to Russia.  Many of these countries in Central Europe 
and the Baltics were once part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and unwillingly had to station 
Soviet troops and nuclear weapons on their soil. While Yost admits that “the key factors shaping 
strategic stability are ultimately political,” he argues that these political perspectives matter.  He states: 
“If reductions to low numbers diminished Allied confidence in the United States as a reliable and 
responsible security guarantor, this could have profoundly destabilizing effects within Europe….”18   
 
Yost also points out that factors outside Europe—such as arms build-ups in South Asia or by China—
could influence opinions in Europe regarding risk, thus making low numbers seem more 
destabilizing.19  One problem is the possible effects of the reduced availability of U.S. nuclear weapons 
for European missions.  Specifically, Yost identifies concerns among Europeans that low numbers will 
encourage a countervalue (and, specifically, anti-cities) strategy that could make U.S. extended 
deterrence in Europe less credible.20  That is, if the only U.S. option for retaliation against Russian 
nuclear use in Europe is the massive slaughter of Russian civilians, Washington might be unwilling to 
respond—or be seen by Moscow as unwilling to respond—thus making deterrence ineffective.  
 
Overall, Yost concludes: “The challenges in maintaining U.S. and Allied confidence in NATO’s 
deterrence and defense posture could be much greater in a situation of ‘low numbers’ than with the 
projected New START levels.”21  
 
                                                
16 David S. Yost, “Risks for Strategic Stability in Europe with Low Numbers of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces,” 
final paper for the project on “Assessing the Impact of Low Nuclear Numbers on Strategic Stability: A Regional 







At the same time, Nikolai Sokov questions Russian willingness to proceed further down the path to 
lower numbers in the first place.  For Russia, nuclear weapons have taken on the role of an “equalizer” 
since the loss of its Eastern European buffer in 1989 and with the major cuts in its conventional forces 
since 1991.22  U.S. missile defense is yet another reason why Russia is not likely to support moves to 
strategic nuclear numbers below 1,000, he says.  Russian concerns with China’s rise and the security 
risks it poses to the sparsely populated Russian Far East are another constraint for Moscow.23   This 
creates a two-level game where cooperation in nuclear reductions with the United States may put 
Russia at a disadvantage in its strategic relations with China.   
 
As Sokov argues: 
The conclusion that follows…is somewhat discouraging: the requirement for the 
multilateralization of the nuclear arms reduction process is likely to acquire an even 
greater importance than today and might turn into another serious stumbling bloc. It 
remains an open question whether a new, perhaps modest, round of bilateral 
reductions remains possible, but even if this is true, in the foreseeable future the ball 
will be increasingly in the court of the “second-tier” states.24 
 
Finally, Sokov observes that Russia is unlikely to support strict verification deemed by the United 
States as necessary at low numbers due to self-perceived doubts about its conventional weapons 
capabilities.25 
 
All of these points suggest that, contrary to popular expectation, Europe may be as much— 
if not more—of a problem for U.S. efforts to reduce nuclear numbers than other regions of the world. 
                                                
22 Nikolai Sokov, “Assessment of Russian Attitudes Toward Phased, Deep Reductions of Nuclear Weapons: Strategic 
and Regional Aspects,” final paper for the project on “Assessing the Impact of Low Nuclear Numbers on Strategic 






Common wisdom regarding the Middle East today is that it is perhaps the region most likely to 
experience instability and new cases of nuclear proliferation over the next two to three decades, with 
Iran as the leading candidate.  Given hostile Israeli-Iranian relations and pressures on the Gulf states to 
respond with nuclear weapons programs of their own, it could therefore be assumed that lower U.S. 
nuclear numbers could lead to further panic among U.S. friends and allies.  Yet although the United 
States fought two major wars against Iraq in 1991 and 2003 and has been involved in hostilities on 
several other occasions (including in Libya in 2011), nuclear weapons have not been part of the 
equation, or at least been very much in the background.  As project author James Russell argues, the 
United States has not made explicit extended nuclear deterrence commitments in the region, even as it 
has provided significant security pledges, sold major armaments, and constructed U.S. bases.26   For 
these reasons, Russell argues that strategic nuclear forces are not central to the U.S. presence and that 
cuts in the U.S. arsenal will not demonstrably affect the region:   
Instead, the United States has successfully pursued a system of conventional 
deterrence and defense throughout the region – arming its friends and allies with a 
range of offensive and defensive conventional weapons over the last quarter century.  
Evidence presented in this paper suggests that there is no compelling reason either for 
the United States to abandon and/or modify the defensive system of conventional 
deterrence and defense by adding nuclear-backed guarantees to the mix.27 
 
While critics point to the threat of a destabilized Middle East if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Russell 
argues that Israeli’s nuclear deterrent combined with U.S. missile defenses and conventional forces are 
likely to be able to maintain the balance of forces without requiring the introduction of a U.S. nuclear 
component.28  Interestingly, in contrast to Europe, Russell notes the considerable ambivalence 
regarding U.S. nuclear deterrence among its friends in the Middle East.  He states: “it is unlikely that 
                                                
26 James A. Russell, “Strategic Stability and the Middle East: Assessing the Impact of Lower Nuclear Numbers,” final 
paper for the project on “Assessing the Impact of Low Nuclear Numbers on Strategic Stability: A Regional 




the regional states themselves either want or desire U.S. nuclear guarantees and instead prefer to 
continue current security arrangements that leave American nuclear weapons out of the equation.”29 
 
Russell caveats some of his remarks when considering a possible future involving an Iran with nuclear 
weapons.  Still, he argues that “even this development would prove unlikely to shift the preferred 
approach of the regional states and its guarantor for conventional deterrence and defense.”30  The 
reasons relate to history and the nature of the military relationship that has been established between 
the United States and various ruling families and governments.  As he explains: “Advances in anti-
missile systems, for example, provide the kinds of defensive capabilities that would help mitigate the 
threat of an Iranian nuclear missile.  Moreover, the continued presence of U.S. forces and the Gulf’s 
extensive military infrastructure present the Sunni monarchies with a continued political assurance 
of America’s commitment to their defense.”31 He concludes: “All of these factors argue against a 
direct relationship between the size and composition of America’s nuclear arsenal and the security 
guarantees extended by the United States to protect its regional interests.”32   
 
Thus, contrary to common expectations, the Middle East may be relatively indifferent to lower U.S. 
nuclear numbers. 
SOUTH ASIA 
South Asia is another region where fears of nuclear stability are widespread, particularly among outside 
observers.  U.S. and Russian reductions, theoretically, could lead to a heightened sense of 
abandonment in both India and Pakistan, possibly stimulating further vertical proliferation.  But Paul 
Kapur argues that the lack of specific U.S. (or Russian) nuclear or defense commitments in the region 
mean that South Asia may not likely to be greatly affected by nuclear cuts.33  Indeed, Kapur argues that 
since neither Pakistan nor India fear the United States as a nuclear rival, U.S. reductions are likely to 





33  S. Paul Kapur, “The United States Move to Low Nuclear Numbers: Effects on South Asia,” final paper for the 
project on “Assessing the Impact of Low Nuclear Numbers on Strategic Stability: A Regional Analysis,” Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, February 28, 2013. 
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have little impact on the region, particularly compared to the status of either’s nuclear forces pitted 
against the other or, for India, the level of Chinese forces.34   
 
Given the recent U.S.-Indian rapprochement, Kapur sees the possibility of U.S. reductions as possibly 
weakening some form of informal extended deterrence.  As he argues: “U.S. nuclear reductions 
may…lead Indian leaders to question its willingness to continue informally to provide deterrence and 
other stabilizing public goods by remaining actively engaged in the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions. 
India could respond with arms racing and coalition building that could threaten Pakistan and China, 
lead them to respond in kind, and increase overall regional tension.”35   
 
But Washington does have tools to address these potential developments.  Kapur argues that 
“Credible United States assurances to India of its commitment to maintaining an active presence in the 
Indian and Pacific Ocean regions would be helpful.  If the Indians feel confident that the U.S. intends 
to remain regionally engaged, they will be less likely to view nuclear cuts as the first step in a process of 
United States retreat, and feel less pressure to adopt potentially destabilizing compensatory 
strategies.”36  He suggests that the recent U.S. “pivot” toward Asia may be helpful in this regard, if the 
United States follows up on its rhetoric.37   
 
Over the longer term, Kapur believes that only U.S. and Russian moves to very low numbers—
sufficient to bring in China—might eventually put pressure on India and Pakistan to join the process 
of nuclear reductions.38  But Pakistan’s view of the centrality of its nuclear arsenal for its survival in the 
face of an economically and militarily more powerful India make such trends unlikely, unless broader 
(currently unforeseeable) changes in global security were to occur.  
 







Thus, the expected outcome is neither positive nor especially negative.  But continued nuclear tensions 
in South Asian and a situation where the United States has relatively limited leverage challenges the 
viability of a broad international move to very low nuclear numbers. 
EAST ASIA  
The dominant focus of East Asian countries over the past several decades has been on economic 
development and trade.  But China’s rise and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have 
created significant unease among U.S. allies in the region, making the prospect of lower nuclear forces 
less welcome than in other parts of the world.  East Asian countries are uncertain regarding 
Pyongyang’s possible motivations and seek to avoid possible coercion from a China that is both 
economically and militarily far more powerful than it was at any point in the twentieth century.  For 
these reasons, there is likely to be a significant need in this region to reassure U.S. allies of the 
credibility of its commitments and the continued viability of U.S. extended deterrence. 
 
Wade Huntley’s study for this project notes how both South Korea and Japan requested bilateral 
discussions on extended deterrence after the 2010 NPR was released and have since eagerly engaged 
U.S. officials on the topic of nuclear security.39  Despite these efforts, two-thirds of South Koreans 
believe that their country should acquire nuclear weapons,40 something the United States does not 
support and would certainly find destabilizing, as well as counter to its intentions in pursuing further 
nuclear reductions.  Japanese public opinion is less openly supportive of nuclear weapons, but officials 
have repeatedly voiced concern over the importance of the U.S. nuclear commitment to its security.  
As Huntley writes: “Reassuring allies of the integrity and commitment of U.S. security guarantees is 
perhaps the most important factor shaping the strength of those alliance relationships [with South 
Korea and Japan].”41 
 
Nevertheless, Huntley’s reading of the politics of these two U.S. Asian allies suggests that 
nuclear weapons themselves may not be the most important part of the equation.  As he observes: 
                                                
39 Wade Huntley, “Assessing the Impact of Low Nuclear Numbers on Strategic Stability: The Cases of Japan and South 
Korea,” paper for the project on “Assessing the Impact of Low Nuclear Numbers on Strategic Stability: A 
Regional Analysis,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 18, 2012.  
40 “2/3 of S. Koreans Support Nuclear Armament,” Chosun Ilbo, English edition, February 21, 2013.  
41 Ibid. 
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Recognizing the centrality of security reassurances in the U.S. alliance relationships 
with Japan and South Korea fruitfully directs analysis to the many factors…that lie 
outside the criteria of nuclear deterrence credibility, such as supporting deterrence with 
conventional forces, straightforward defense (including missile defenses), transparency 
and communication to minimize misperceptions, socio-political harmony, and 
promoting a durably improved regional security environment.42 
 
Huntley concludes that possible negative implications of U.S. nuclear reductions can be managed, but 
that “fulsome and effective consultations” with both allies, renewed reassurance of the U.S. presence 
in the region, and firm reiteration of its extended deterrence guarantees (both nuclear and non-nuclear) 
will need to be part of the process.   
 
In regard to China, critics of the Obama administration have suggested that nuclear reductions could 
lead Beijing into grasping the opportunity for a “race to parity.” But China’s perception of its security 
may be less influenced by the number of U.S. nuclear weapons than by the impact of Russian and 
Indian nuclear weapons, as well as the array and posture of the conventional forces that surround it, 
which include U.S. and allied missile defenses.  As Chris Twomey points out, China is comfortable 
living with low numbers of nuclear weapons and has made a limited nuclear arsenal central to its 
deterrent posture since the mid-1960s.43  At the same time, he argues that U.S. motivations to reduce 
nuclear numbers are viewed with suspicion by China, which sees the United States as pursuing 
compensatory advantages in space, conventional precision weapons, and missile defense.  Twomey 
suggests that if the United States wants to do more to ensure Chinese restraint in response to U.S. 
nuclear reductions, it might need to consider new signaling policies, such as adopting a pledge on the 
no-first-use of nuclear weapons,44 a long-held Chinese goal.  Additionally, U.S. pledges to accept 
certain limits of scale or type in the area of missile defense—such as perhaps refraining from placing 
missile defenses in space— or offering reassurance regarding U.S. reactions to Chinese missile defense 
                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 Christopher P. Twomey, “Nuclear Stability ad Low Numbers: The Perspective from Beijing,” final paper for the 
project on “Assessing the Impact of Low Nuclear Numbers on Strategic Stability: A Regional Analysis,” Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 26, 2013. 
44 Ibid. 
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efforts might help elicit more receptive Chinese nuclear behavior and help convince China that the 
United States is not seeking to acquire a first-strike advantage (as Chinese critics charge).   
 
But China remains concerned, according to Twomey, about the implications of extended nuclear 
deterrence pledges in emboldening Japan in its territorial disputes with China, a major issue of concern 
for Beijing.45  Instability related to conflicting territorial claims could also fuel pressures for regional 
arms racing, which could drag in the United States.  As Twomey argues, the Chinese “continue to call 
for improving those broader political relations as a key determinant of true strategic stability.”46 
 
For these reasons, continued dialogue with China on nuclear and other security issues will likely be 
necessary if Washington ever hopes to achieve the kind of multilateralization of nuclear arms 
reductions that might make very low numbers feasible.  China remains, in many respects, on a 
different sheet of music.  Twomey notes: “[G]iven that Chinese threat perceptions in the strategic 
arena have sources other than “high numbers” of U.S. weapons, these are not likely to be materially 
assuaged by unilateral reductions, nor are such reductions likely to entice Chinese reductions 
themselves.”47   
 
U.S. commitments to limit other systems, according to sources cited by Twomey, may be necessary if 
it seeks to bring China into actual nuclear reductions at some point in the future.  He is pessimistic 
regarding near-term prospects.  In the long term, however, he sees the possibility of an eventual 
opening.  He observes: “Chinese views on the role of missile defenses and stability may change in 
coming years.  China has begun to develop its own system, and its military leaders are grasping for 
strategic concepts to guide its use.”48  Again, discussions with the United States could yield new 
grounds for coordination.   
 
Still, bilateral relations and China’s own perception of its security needs would likely have to change.  
Accordingly, Twomey concludes on a note of caution, saying: “[I]t seems likely that in the context of 






continued U.S. conventional dominance, reducing Chinese arsenal size is likely to be viewed as 
destabilizing by Chinese leaders.”49 
CONCLUSION  
The purpose of moving to lower nuclear numbers is ultimately about increasing U.S. and broader 
international security.  For this reason, moving toward such reductions needs to be a carefully thought 
out process.  The United States, as the world’s most powerful country, has both the most to lose if this 
effort goes wrong and potentially the most to gain if it can be carried out in a manner that puts all 
countries on a path toward cooperative security, nonproliferation, and reduced nuclear tensions.  
Unfortunately, as the papers in this collection show, there is still much work to be done in various 
regions of the world to ensure such success.   
 
Substantive questions need to be addressed regarding how much conventional weapons, for example, 
can substitute for nuclear weapons.  As Trachtenberg notes, despite their accuracy and new ability to 
defeat military targets, “they cannot substitute for nuclear weapons in all cases.”50  But some of these 
points, in regard to adversaries, may be subjective.  Again, as Trachtenberg correctly notes: 
“Deterrence is an art, not a science.”51  By the same token, reassurance is also in the eye of the 
beholder.  The credibility of extended deterrence may be questionable (or credible) at both high 
numbers and low numbers, in part because it relates to the perceptions and intentions of the adversary.  
It also relates to the strength of the deterrence commitment to one’s ally (credibility) and how that 
commitment is perceived.  A strong commitment may be given, but not recognized.  All of these 
points suggest that the psychological component of nuclear deterrence remains critical and could 
provide either success or failure at lower nuclear numbers. 
 
In terms of policy priorities for consideration by the U.S. government, several recommendations might 
be proposed based on this research: 
                                                
49 Ibid. 
50 Trachtenberg, “US Extended Deterrence,” pp. 79. 
51 Ibid., p. 85. 
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• Consultations with allies are critical and will need to involve adjustments in security 
relations to include stronger elements of reassurance through joint training and 
discussion of crisis management, including nuclear crises. 
• Discussions with Russia as the main potential partner in ensuring cooperative 
movement below 1,000 weapons are needed to address Russian concerns (if possible) 
and to begin engagement of China, which is a major concern of both Washington and 
Moscow. 
• U.S. adoption of new reassurance mechanisms might be useful to counter Chinese 
claims that lower numbers are being pursued in order to increase U.S. unilateral 
advantages.  These mechanisms might include U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, a no-first-use pledge regarding nuclear weapons, and efforts to 
engage China in cooperative monitoring and verification of lower nuclear numbers to 
enhance crisis prevention and, if one occurs, stability. 
• Regional security initiatives involving the permanent five members of the UN Security 
Council and other relevant parties might be useful to address shared security concerns 
in three main regions of concern: the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia.  These 
discussions could focus on confidence-building, threat reduction, and mutual non-
aggression pacts, while beginning to address underlying security problems whose 
solution are likely to be prerequisites to moving lower nuclear numbers. 
 
This project on the regional implications of U.S. moves to lower nuclear numbers has been but a first 
step into a field that requires more research.  With this in mind, it is worth setting out some possibly 
fruitful directions for follow-on studies.  First, more work is needed on regions outside the focus of 
this study.  While the main emphasis of this research was on regions with either close U.S. allies or 
with other nuclear weapon states, African and Latin American countries could conceivably have 
different reactions to changes in the nuclear balance.  Studies on these regions would be useful to 
supplement the findings of this project.  Second, more work is needed on how to construct the new 
allied and other international reassurance mechanisms called for by this research.  None of this will be 
easy.  Governments will need to get used to closer consultations on nuclear matters and with military-
to-military dialogues on crisis prevention, possibly even including cooperative U.S.-Russian and U.S.-
Chinese nuclear exercises.   
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Third, the area of verification—particularly cooperative verification—is an under-studied issue.  While 
a variety of new technologies can now be applied to this problem, sharing sensitive nuclear 
information is likely to be difficult and may require new consultative bodies and unique technical 
protocols. Recent experience with the Comprehensive Test Ban Organization in Vienna or in the 
International Atomic Energy Agency may provide some useful guidelines.  But verifying low numbers 
is likely to pose unique challenges and require more intrusive forms of verification and cooperation, 
including in early warning, typically a highly sensitive field.   
 
Fourth, additional research will be needed on the viability of deterrence with modern conventional 
weapons.  In the past, conventional deterrence proved relatively ineffective, at least judging by their 
failure to prevent World Wars I and II.  Modern, precision-guided munitions offer new potential to 
target leaderships and other extremely highly valued personnel, infrastructure, and military assets.  But 
can they prevent hostile actors from beginning hostilities?  This point remains unclear, as does the 
breadth of what conventional deterrence might accomplish.  Signaling matters, and such efforts have 
not yet been made in the advance of any specific conflict with a nuclear power or one threatening vital 
interests of U.S. allies. Further specific research might help clarify these points.  
 
Fifth, and finally, more research will be required on how to deal with outliers in regard to nuclear 
reductions.  At lower nuclear numbers, relative disparities between nuclear arsenals may be viewed as 
destabilizing, particularly given the potential for breakout.  Moreover, if certain countries fail to join 
the process, collective persuasion and/or sanctions may be necessary, if the process of reductions is to 
be able to continue at all.  These are challenges that the current nonproliferation regime faces, but they 
are likely to become even more important once major powers lose the still substantial nuclear hedge 
that they currently possess.    
 
Overall, these various cautions and concerns need not derail movement toward lower nuclear 
numbers.  The important message from this research is that getting the details right and tailoring them 
to the specific security requirements of individual regions is going to be a necessary part of the success 
of any such process.  Again, the risks of failure—even in an era when the U.S-Russian relationship is 
much more amicable—are substantial.  Progress will likely be slow. But doing the political and military 
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spadework to develop new security and reassurance mechanisms should provide spillover benefits in 
terms of helping to foster general conditions for improved nuclear communication, stability, and, 
conflict prevention.  
